According to the theory in question, propositions or Thoughts. (Gedanken) exist in the quite special sense of being ‘wirklich’—a. Fregean term of art which I shall. In focusing on Frege’s account of thinking, rather than ‘thoughts [Gedanken]’ or the ‘truth-values [Wahrheitswerthe]’ of thoughts, their approach. PDF | Michael Dummett has advanced, very influentially, the view that Frege means truth conditions by his notion of thought (Gedanke). My aim in this paper is to.

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While “identity”, as Frege uses the term, is a relation holding only between objects, Frege believes that there is a relation similar to identity that holds between functions just in case they always share the same value for every argument.

Translated as “On the Foundations of Geometry. Harvard University Press HermesH. The sense of an expression, however, is the “mode of presentation” or cognitive content associated with the expression in virtue of which the gedanoe is picked out.

Gottlob Frege (1848—1925)

Views Read Edit View history. These expressions are incomplete in the sense that they contain an “empty space”, which, when filled, yields either a complex name geeanke to an object, or a complete proposition.

Because of the unfavorable reception of his earlier works, Frege was forced to arrange to have volume II of the G rundgesetze published at his own expense. However, we must bear in mind that the propositions:.

Inwith the recommendation of Ernst Abbe, Frege received a lectureship at the University of Jena, where he stayed the rest of his intellectual life.

Gottlob Frege – Wikipedia

Frege also introduced an identity sign, standing for a function whose value is the True if the two arguments are the same object, and the False otherwise, and a sign, which he called “the horizontal,” namely “—”, that stands for a function that has the True as value for the True as argument, and has the False as value for any other argument.


Moreover, senses are interpersonal. However, he still had time to work on his first major work in logic, which was published in under the title Gedanks, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens “Concept-Script: This was the position I was placed in by a letter of Mr.

Therein, Frege presented for the first time his invention of a new method for the construction of a logical language. But different sorts of functions require different sorts of arguments. As a philosopher of mathematics, Frege attacked the psychologistic appeal to mental explanations of the content of judgment of the gedankee of sentences.

rfege The Editor of the Rivista di Matematica was G. His father Carl Karl Alexander Frege — was the co-founder and headmaster of a girls’ high school until his death. One deck of cards contains fifty two cards, but each card consists of a multitude of atoms. In other words, Frege subscribed to logicism. So far we have only considered the distinction as it applies to expressions that name some object including abstract objects, such as numbers.

While Frege’s logical language represented a kind of formal system, he insisted that his formal system was important only because of what its signs represent and its propositions mean.

Studies on Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy. Yet it is gedankr by accounting for the more robust epistemic gwdanke that Frege means to ascribe to thinking, beyond its receptivity in grasping, that we can hope to take the full measure of Frege’s ambitious and revolutionary claim for the epistemic significance of thinking itself: We need not dwell on the details of this work here.


While the truth of an identity statement involves geranke the references of the component expressions, the informativity of such statements involves additionally the way in which those references are determined, i.

Gottlob Frege > Chronological Catalog of Frege’s Work (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Rather than understanding zero as the concept a concept has just in case it is not instantiated, zero gedannke understood as the value-range consisting of value-ranges of concepts that are not instantiated. Frege uses the example of a specific sensed phenomenon: Conversely, there does not seem to be anything prohibiting a mind whose thinking is not ‘purely logical’ in the authors’ sense of also having representations occurring in the mind, from engaging with thoughts that are ‘purely logical’ in the sense of being solely about the subject-matter of logic.

We have seen how the notion of successorship can be defined for Frege, i. Frege opened the Appendix with the exceptionally honest comment: Wittgenstein in Focus — Im Brennpunkt: Bad KleinenMecklenburg-SchwerinGermany.

Clearly, however, these expressions do not present that concept in the same way.

As we shall see belowFrege was also committed to other logical entities such as senses and thoughts. Olms AngelelliI. It is rather that the sense consists in some set of descriptive information, and this information is best described by a descriptive phrase of this form. On Mill’s view, numbers must be taken to be conglomerations of objects.

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